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44
Internal and external food safety audits are conducted to assess the safety and quality of 45 food including on-farm production, manufacturing practices, sanitation, and hygiene.
46
Some auditors are direct stakeholders that are employed by food establishments to 47 conduct internal audits, while other auditors may represent the interests of a second-48 party purchaser or a third-party auditing agency. Some buyers conduct their own 49 audits or additional testing, while some buyers trust the results of third-party audits or 50
inspections. Third-party auditors, however, use various food safety audit standards 51 and most do not have a vested interest in the products being sold. Audits are conducted 52 under a proprietary standard, while food safety inspections are generally conducted 53 within a legal framework. There have been many foodborne illness outbreaks linked to 54 food processors that have passed third-party audits and inspections, raising questions 55 about the utility of both. Supporters argue third-party audits are a way to ensure food 56 safety in an era of dwindling economic resources. Critics contend that while external 57 audits and inspections can be a valuable tool to help ensure safe food, such activities 58 represent only a snapshot in time. This paper identifies limitations of food safety 59
inspections and audits and provides recommendations for strengthening the system, 60 based on developing a strong food safety culture, including risk-based verification 61 steps, throughout the food safety system. 62 63
Introduction 64 65
Billions of meals are prepared safely each day throughout the world. The commercial 66 food system relies on audits and inspections to assess the practices and processes used 67 to by food producers at each step in the production chain. Yet when outbreaks of 68 foodborne illness happen, the results can be emotionally, physically and financially 69 devastating to the victims and the businesses involved. Many outbreaks involve firms 70 that have had their food production systems verified and received acceptable ratings 71 from food safety auditors or government inspectors. 72 73
Food safety audits and inspections are one activity used to verify that a food producer 74 or individual is following specific guidelines, requirements or rules. Audits involve a 75 "systematic and independent examination to determine whether quality/safety 76 activities and related results comply with planned arrangements and whether these 77 arrangements are implemented effectively and are suitable to achieve objectives" 78 (ANZFA, 2001; ANZFA was later morphed into Food Standards Australia New 79 Zealand). Planned arrangements, as defined by the Australia New Zealand Food 80
Authority are commonly referred to as standards within the food industry. The 81 difference between inspections and audits is that an inspection evaluates "conformity 82 by measuring, observing, testing or gauging the relevant characteristics"(ANZFA, 83 2001). Audits are one tool to help ensure adherence to recognized regulations and good 84 manufacturing practices. 85 86 M A N U S C R I P T
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doubled, would not be enough to make sure every food item is safe. Third party audits 130 provide the data upon which certification and buying decisions are made, and are now 131 a popular choice for retailers who use them to push the responsibility (and costs) for 132
food safety and quality back on to the supplier (Steir, 2009 ). Audits are an attempt to 133 move beyond inspections that are point-in-time observations of activities and practices.
134
Audits focus on the procedures in place to achieve food safety outcomes and look for 135 evidence that they are being followed and are appropriate and capable of reducing risk.
136
There is also increasing focus on assessment of food safety culture and management 137 commitment to food safety. 138 139
Third-party audits also benefit individual companies and supply chains. It has been 140 argued that the best use of third-party audits is to focus on strengthening self-audit 141 methods and operational controls to achieve safer food (Costa, 2010) .For some, it is a 142 genuine desire to improve food safety, quality and sanitation or a way to 143 solve/troubleshoot existing problems (Steir, 2009 ). For others it is a potential marketing 144 advantage or a customer requirement. The effectiveness of these audits may link to the 145 motivation behind the audit. It has been determined that creating a food safety culture 146 is imperative to an effective food safety risk management system (Powell et al., 2011; 147 Yiannas, 2008) . Companies with a strong food safety culture may be more likely to 148 obtain a third party audit because they want to improve operations, not just because of 149 customer demand. Companies with a strong food safety culture are also likely to use 150 audit results as guidance and opportunity to improve their practices. Audits --first-151 second-or third-party --are another tool for companies to enhance safe food 152 production.
154
What is not clear is the role of third party audits in reducing the risk of contaminated 155 food reaching the marketplace and the ability of auditors to identify problems or high-156 risk operations. The utility of third party audits has been examined in other industries 157 as well. A 10-year study on workplace safety on U.S. railroads found that high audit 158 scores partially correlated with improved legislative compliance but did not necessarily 159 correspond to improved safety performance (Peterson, 2001 ). This indicated there were 160 problems somewhere in the system and that the audit process was not necessarily valid 161 for that industry. 162 163
Limitations of audits 164 165
Audit systems, in their current form, have limitations in improving food safety. There 166 are no current empirical evaluations that look at the correlation between audit scores 167 and foodborne illness outbreaks but there is a long and storied history of food safety 168 failures involving third-party audits. 169 170
Third-party audits are analogous in many ways to regulatory municipal inspections of 171 foodservice operations: the effectiveness of both audits and inspections is driven largely 172 M A N U S C R I P T 
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Reliance on an effective standard
The audit is only as effective as the standard against which the practices are being measured. Standards must be evidence-based, designed to address the commodity/product specific risks and practices and responsive to changing industry practices and new science as it becomes available.
Cantaloupe outbreak, July 2011. Previous research had focused on Salmonella and current industry standards may not be robust enough to address risk from Listeria.
Effective audit tool
The audit tool (or audit checklist) must be valid. There is no scientific basis for certification/validation in audits (Mahshie, 2009 ). There is high variability in the quality and reliability of audits and many different types of audit tools that vary in length, complexity, and style. A firm may pass some audits but still have a food safety risk factor Salmonella in eggs, Iowa, 2010, lead to 2,000 illnesses and the recall of 500 million eggs. DeCoster received a superior rating from AIB International, despite audit reports that are typically 10-20 pages and consider over 300 elements (AIB International, 2007) .
Auditor competence
Audits require more than just a checklist, they require paying attention and thinking. The individual ability of an auditor has a significant impact on the outcome of the audit, most thirdparty audits look for objective evidence to assess compliance, but effective auditors must be able to assess risk, particularly in unique situations and synthesize the information provided to determine effectiveness of the food safety management system
In the aftermath of the PCA outbreak, the competency of both the auditor and the auditing firm were criticized. The auditor of the PCA facility was an experienced auditor but was an expert in fresh produce and was not aware that peanuts were susceptible to Salmonella (Moss and Martin, 2009)
Audit scope
The audit scope must be broad enough to cover all operations, locations and products. When a company is presented with different price quotes they often choose the cheapest one, which is more likely the one with less audit time (Pronk, 2011) . This reduces cost for the firm requesting the audit, and reduces the ability of the auditor to see all parts of a complex operation as well as the possibility of the auditor finding instances of noncompliance.
On June 28, 2007, Veggie Booty snack food was linked to an outbreak of Salmonella. The plant that made Veggie Booty had received a rating of "excellent" from AIB International, raising questions about the efficacy of auditors and audits, which, in this case and others, did not extend to ingredient suppliers (Moss & Martin, 2009 ).
Conflict of Interest
Almost all food producers/retailers require their suppliers to pay for their own audits. A company receiving a poor audit may be unwilling to hire that auditor again. Even with safeguards in place, auditing bodies still must rely on the honesty of their auditors to declare potential conflicts
Follow-up
Auditors have no legal authority and cannot demand records, embargo products or close an operation (Costa, 2011) . Neither the auditor nor the audited company is required to report non-compliances, even automatic failures, to regulatory agencies. If the buyer does not review the audit report closely, which is often the case (Prevor, 2011a) , they may never know that their supplier had a serious non-conformance.
202
In response to some of the criticisms around third party audits and standards and the 203 growing number of private standards with no real oversight over their development, 204 Critics see many problems with the general way third-party audits are currently 239 conducted and have described them as the equivalent of "mail-order diplomas" (Moss 240 & Martin, 2009). As far as being the "eyes and ears" for a company buying from the 241 audited supplier, many problems are apparently missed during visits (Weise, 2010) .
242
Heavy reliance on prescriptive checklists may increase auditor consistency, allow for 243 cost savings on training but also reduces their ability to assess risk. This ultimately 244 results in a pool of auditors that are poorly qualified to assess the risks associated 245 within individual operations. It is imperative for the food industry to aggressively take 246 M A N U S C R I P T A C C E P T E D where employees said the facility was "a dump," but did not report their concerns to 283 officials before people became ill and died (Sharp, 2009 ). Audits, regulatory inspections 284 and testing are an important part of the food safety system, but alone and individually 285 they are not enough.
287
Education and training are the focus of many food handling behavior interventions. 288
However, research suggests that the impacts of food handler training programs are 289 In 2010, beef processor JBS started a trial using video cameras as part of their third-307 party monitoring and auditing efforts (Crews, 2011) . Strategically placed cameras 308 recorded footage that could then be observed by auditors around-the-clock and random 309 audits could then be conducted remotely. Not only does this allow for immediate 310 feedback, it has also proven an effective training tool for employees, as they can observe 311 and learn from watching themselves at work (Crews, 2011) . Improvement at the pilot 312 plant was seen in days instead of months and compliance rates consistently exceeded 313 99%. Errors can be addressed almost immediately before problems develop (Crews, 314 2011). 315 316
Assessing food-handling practices of staff through internal observations, externally-led 317 evaluations, and audit and inspection results can provide indicators of a food safety 318 culture. Results of these evaluations can be used to modify interventions and further 319 improve the organization's culture of food safety (Mitchell et al, 2007 
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manufacturer's instructions, had meat residue trapped deep inside the slicing 333 mechanisms (Weatherill, 2009 ). An independent investigative review commissioned by 334 the Canadian federal government concluded that the focus on food safety was 335 insufficient among senior management at both the company and the various 336 government organizations involved before and during the outbreak; that insufficient 337 planning had been undertaken to be prepared for a potential outbreak; and that those 338 involved lacked a sense of urgency at the outset of the outbreak (Mason, 2009 ). 339 340
The specific plant linked to the outbreak received satisfactory marks from federal 341 inspectors for complying with federal regulatory requirements. They appeared to be 342 doing everything right. Employees consistently addressed instances of non-compliance 343 when they were identified. The plant's management maintained all required records, 344 ensured that staff training took place, and ensured the established quality assurance 345 program was followed. At all plants, the company conducted environmental testing 346 that went beyond regulatory requirements (Weatherill, 2009 The use of audits to help create, improve, and maintain a genuine food safety culture 356 holds the most promise in preventing foodborne illness and safeguarding public health.
357
A common thread in all of the outbreaks described above is a clear lack of food safety 358 culture among the implicated companies. In the E. coli outbreak in South Wales, a 359 public inquiry into the outbreak by Professor Hugh Pennington (2009) found that, in 360 addition to allowing cross contamination through the operation's single vacuum 361 packaging machine, butcher William Tudor encouraged ill employees to continue 362 working in establishments and preparing meat for sale. Upon review of statements 363 made by employees and environmental health officers to the police, of video and 364 photographic evidence, and of management documentation, Professor Chris Griffith 365 (2010), head of the food research and consultancy unit at the University of Wales 366
Institute, Cardiff, told the inquiry the culture at the premises was one of little regard for 367 the importance of food safety but where making and saving money was the priority. 368
Health code violations at the abattoir were longstanding, repetitive and widely known 369 among environmental health officers responsible for inspecting the operation. Although 370 foodborne illness may not always be completely preventable, that the risk of a business 371 causing foodborne illness is, to a large extent, a consequence of its own activities. Audit 372 and inspection information must be leveraged into corrective actions to mitigate risk. 373 374 M A N U S C R I P T
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Food safety culture, not only within the company but also within a supply chain should 375 also be emphasized. In both the Odwalla and PCA outbreaks, second-party audits were 376 able to identify problems the third party auditors did not. Open communication 377
between suppliers and buyers including expectations and risk management practices is 378 essential. Systems where retailers work with their suppliers to help them achieve 379 objectives have had somewhat better buy-in from suppliers and may achieve better 380 results because they reinforce that culture. (Rains, 2009; Steir, 2009 
M A N U S C R I P T A C C E P T E D ACCEPTED MANUSCRIPT

Reactive investigations based on direct consumer complaints or concerns raised 87 through social media may provide additional information. 88 89
An audit of food safety practices, facilities, documentation and written procedures is 90 used to gather information regarding food production and processing practices being 91 followed by a particular producer, identifying areas for improvement and areas that are 92 deficient (ANZFA, 2001). Audit reports, in theory, serve as the "eyes and ears" for an 93 organization buying food from a supplier (Weise, 2010) . There are several types of 94 audits, and a variety of audit organizations, each with their own unique or common 95 food safety guidelines. 96 97
Self-audits are internal audits performed by a food establishment itself. These 98 businesses usually have a quality assurance team that leads the internal audits. These 99 internal audits may have good potential for reducing risk if the methods followed are 100 those outlined in widely accepted codes and risk assessment guidance documents. 101
Second-party audits are audits that a downstream company, or buyer, performs on their 102
supplier. Third-party audits are performed by an outside firm that usually focuses 103 entirely on verification or standard implementation to ensure that a buyer's rules are 104 being followed (Costa, 2010) . Third-party audits examine compliance with laws and 105 codes of practice as well as provide "insight into management controls and 106 supervision" (Costa, 2010 Third-party audits are one part of a multi-factorial approach to food safety. The 111 popularity of third-party audits has increased corresponding to a shift in food safety 112 governance away from government regulation and inspection towards the 113 development of private food safety standards (Busch, 2011 (Busch, 2011) . This has created a system for enforcing 121 food safety standards with little burden on taxpayers. 122 123
Costa (2010) argues that third-party audits should focus on strengthening self-audit 124 methods and operational controls to achieve safer food and maximize benefits. The U.S. from the auditor --and get it. Doering (2010) has also said responsibility for verification 131 primarily lies with industry, given that inspection efforts, even if doubled, would not be 132 enough to make sure every food item is safe. Third-party audits provide the data upon 133 which certification and buying decisions are made, and are now a popular choice for 134 retailers who use them to push the responsibility (and costs) for food safety and quality 135 back on to the supplier (Steir, 2009 practices. Audits --first-second-or third-party --are another tool for companies to 148 enhance safe food production.
150
What is not clear is the role of third party audits in reducing the risk of contaminated 151 food reaching the marketplace and the ability of auditors to identify problems or high 152 risk operations. The utility of third party audits has been examined in other industries 153 as well. A 10-year study on workplace safety on U.S. railroads found that high audit 154 scores partially correlated with improved legislative compliance but did not necessarily 155 correspond to improved safety performance (Peterson, 2001 ). This indicated there were 156 problems somewhere in the system and that the audit process was not necessarily valid 157 for that industry. an audit is becoming more common. High-risk activities are identified, such as the 211 quality of water used for washing fresh produce, and if the producer is not compliant 212 with those items, they fail the audit regardless of the final score. Many standards also 213 allow the auditor to suggest an auto-failure if they identify and document any situation 214 they deem to be an immediate food safety risk (CanadaGAP, 2012) . Tudor & Son, a catering butcher business. A packaging machine at the business, used 222 for both raw and cooked meats, was identified as the probable source of contamination 223
-where E. coli O157:H7 was most likely transferred from raw meat to cooked meat and 224 was then distributed to four authorities in South Wales for their school meal programs. 225
Ultimately, 31 people were admitted to hospital and, tragically, Mason Jones died. 226 227
Following the Wales outbreak, a number of mistakes and shortcomings by 228 environmental health officers were identified -which in no way lessened the primary 229 responsibility on the supplier of contaminated food --including the failure of one 230 officer to verify claims that all food handlers had food hygiene certificates and the 231 failure by another to insist that steps be taken to prevent cross contamination between 232 raw and cooked meats during vacuum packaging (Pennington, 2009 revealed that the suspect facilities had received a third-party audit of their good 250 agricultural practices (GAPs) from auditor Primus Labs that did not raise concerns for 251 the buyer, Dole Foods, to alter any purchasing decisions. This was the 29 th documented 252 outbreak of foodborne illness involving leafy greens in the U.S. Despite decades of 253 letters and pleading by regulators to the industry to improve microbiological safety 254 standards, there was no verification that farmers and others in the farm-to-fork food 255 safety system were seriously incorporating and acting on risk reduction messages, 256 especially in production fields rather than just processing facilities (Powell et al., 2009 ). Food safety auditors and inspectors are an integral part of the food safety system, and 262 their use will expand in the future, for both domestic and imported foodstuffs. Critics see many problems with the general way third-party audits are currently 284 conducted and have described them as the equivalent of "mail-order diplomas" (Moss 285 & Martin, 2009 ). As far as being the "eyes and ears" for a company buying from the 286 audited supplier, many problems are apparently missed during visits (Weise, 2010 ).
287
It is imperative for the food industry to aggressively take corrective actions and make 288 third-party audits and inspections more meaningful, more accurate, and to fully 289 enhance the safety of consumers. 290 291
In an effort to improve the third party audit system, FDA is working to establish 292 accreditation programs under a new food safety law, to insure the quality of audits 293 (Karst, 2011) . FDA is also trying to make audit results accessible so they can analyze the 294 results for effectiveness and reliability (Karst, 2011) . FDA released guidance for industry 295 in 2009 regarding voluntary third-party certification programs for foods and feeds 296 (FDA, 2009a) . In this document, it is clearly stated that industry has the primary 297 responsibility to ensure that food products are safe and meet FDA requirements. The 298 document outlines recommendations for third-party certification programs such as 299 qualifications and training for auditors including coursework and field training. These 300 recommendations, though helpful, are not "legally established responsibilities" and the 301 M A N U S C R I P T
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8 extensive use of the word "should" in the document infers a recommendation rather 302 than a requirement (FDA, 2009a where employees said the facility was "a dump," but did not report their concerns to 319 officials before people became ill and died (Sharp, 2009 In 2010, beef processor JBS started a trial using video cameras as part of their third-343 party monitoring and auditing efforts (Crews, 2011) . Strategically placed cameras 344 M A N U S C R I P T
recorded footage that could then be observed by auditors around-the-clock and random 345 audits could then be conducted remotely. Not only does this allow for immediate 346 feedback, it has also proven an effective training tool for employees, as they can observe 347 and learn from watching themselves at work (Crews, 2011 (Weatherill, 2009 ). An independent investigative review commissioned by 370 the Canadian federal government concluded that the focus on food safety was 371 insufficient among senior management at both the company and the various 372 government organizations involved before and during the outbreak; that insufficient 373 planning had been undertaken to be prepared for a potential outbreak; and that those 374 involved lacked a sense of urgency at the outset of the outbreak (Mason, 2009 ). 375 376
The specific plant linked to the outbreak received satisfactory marks from federal 377 inspectors for complying with federal regulatory requirements. They appeared to be 378 doing everything right. Employees consistently addressed instances of non-compliance 379 when they were identified. The plant's management maintained all required records, 380 ensured that staff training took place, and ensured the established quality assurance 381 program was followed. At all plants, the company conducted environmental testing 382 that went beyond regulatory requirements (Weatherill, 2009 Institute, Cardiff, told the inquiry the culture at the premises was one of little regard for 406 the importance of food safety but where making and saving money was the priority.
407
Health code violations at the abattoir were longstanding, repetitive and widely known 408 among environmental health officers responsible for inspecting the operation Although 409 foodborne illness may not always be completely preventable, Griffith (2010) concluded 410 that the risk of a business causing foodborne illness is, to a large extent, a consequence 411 of its own activities.
413
Food safety culture, not only within the company but also within a supply chain should 414 also be emphasized. In both the Odwalla and PCA outbreaks, second-party audits were 415 able to identify problems the third party auditors did not. Open communication 416
between suppliers and buyers including expectations and risk management practices is 417 essential. Systems where retailers work with their suppliers to help them achieve 418 objectives have had somewhat better buy-in from suppliers and may achieve better 419 results because they reinforce that culture. (Rains, 2009; Steir, 2009 (Martin, 2009) M A N U S C R I P T
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